Alexey Losev's concept of 'personality' was developed in his writings from the 1920s, "The Dialectics of Myth" and "The Philosophy of Name". In his later works (e.g. on the aesthetics of the Renaissance and in his book about Vladimir Soloviev) Losev also understood the 'personality' outside of the boundaries of philosophy and theology. For him, the mystical dimension of personality in the end dominates logical and cultural structures of the subject. Losev's concept of 'personality' as a myth, a symbol, rather (...) than an abstract theory was an attack on the European individualism seen as a principle of the self-affirmation of the isolated subject. (shrink)

Alexey Losev's concept of 'personality' was developed in his writings from the 1920s, "The Dialectics of Myth" and "The Philosophy of Name". In his later works Losev also understood the 'personality' outside of the boundaries of philosophy and theology. For him, the mystical dimension of personality in the end dominates logical and cultural structures of the subject. Losev's concept of 'personality' as a myth, a symbol, rather than an abstract theory was an attack on the European individualism seen as a (...) principle of the self-affirmation of the isolated subject. (shrink)

Post-Theories in Literary and Cultural Studies brings to attention the post-theoretical discussions on the changing perceptions in literary and cultural studies. In four sections the volume presents essays that trace the engagement of post-theory with post-postmodernism, posthumanism, ethics, and politics.

This paper sketches an historical outline of philosophy in Russia from the modern era to present time. It describes the main philosophical trends that characterized the ‘Silver Age’ in pre-revolutionary Russia (Cosmism, religious philosophy and early Marxist philosophy), and draws some lines of continuity both with Marxist and pre-Marxist philosophy. It studies the internal evolution and organization of Soviet official philosophical thought, and describes the main features the philosophical Renaissance that took place in the Soviet Union in the second half (...) of the 20th century. It finally describes the main trends, authors and publication of philosophy in Russia today. (shrink)

The discussion on Party ethics in the 1920s is an undeservedly forgotten page in the intellectual history of Soviet society. The new interest in it is due not only to the reawakened thirst for complete knowledge about our past and the much sharpened interest in moral and ethical problems. Another aspect is much more important: it goes back to the sources of socioethical utilitarianism and the distortions in morals associated with it that to a certain extent are specific to socialism. (...) In its current criticism and progress toward overcoming these distortions our society is coming to understand morality as a value in itself, as well as its permanent, universally human foundations. This debate will teach us much, and alert us against a lot. We shall dwell only on a few, in our opinion the most topical, lessons. (shrink)

V. T. Efimov's polemical remarks "Ethics and Moral Studies" pose the question of whether it is necessary to detach from philosophy what would be an independent learned discipline — moral studies, as the theory of morality. Furthermore, in his opinion, the emergence of moral studies does not mean that ethics also would become a specialized learned discipline. Ethics would be retained as the discipline studying "philosophical questions in the theory of morality.".

L.N. Tolstoy produced an original religious-moral doctrine that became known as Tolstoyism. It was left on the periphery of the spiritual processes in the twentieth century and, undeservedly, was forgotten. This becomes particularly obvious in the context of contemporary discussions about the dialogue of cultures and the interrelation between universalism and particularism. Tolstoy sought only the transcultural foundations of human existence. The basic questions that he examines as a thinker and wrestles with as a human being is the following: what (...) can religion and morality mean to contemporary men for whom reason is the basis of knowledge and individual responsibility is the basis of behavior? (shrink)

Cet article s'efforce d'analyser la spécificité de l'évolution de la philosophie en Russie au cours du vingtième siècle et jusqu'à présent. Il met en évidence trois courants principaux qui, à partir du début du 20e siècle et pour de nombreuses décennies ultérieures, ont déterminé le paysage philosophique de la Russie : la philosophie religieuse russe du siècle d'argent, le cosmisme russe et le marxisme russe. On montre comment, dans le cadre de la philosophie russe, aussi bien avant qu'après 1917, des (...) tentatives originales ont tenté d'interpréter la rationalité de façon non classique et la manière don't elles ont influencé la logique contemporaine ainsi que d'autres sciences humaines : la psychologie, la linguistique, la théorie littéraire. L'article examine l'étouffement de la pensée philosophique à l'époque du stalinisme et la renaissance, dans la seconde moitié du siècle, de toute une série d'orientations philosophiques (la théorie de la connaissance, la logique, la philosophie et la méthodologie de la science, la philosophie de la psychologie, l'anthropologie philosophique, l'histoire de la philosophie). Des arguments sont présentés pour étayer la thèse d'un élargissement significatif de la problématique et de l'apparition de nombreuses directions philosophiques qui se développent de façon concomitante dans la philosophie russe contemporaine (postérieure à 1991). En conclusion, les auteurs évoquent l'organisation institutionnelle de la vie philosophique dans le pays. (shrink)

Cet article s'efforce d'analyser la spécificité de l'évolution de la philosophie en Russie au cours du vingtième siècle et jusqu'à présent. Il met en évidence trois courants principaux qui, à partir du début du 20e siècle et pour de nombreuses décennies ultérieures, ont déterminé le paysage philosophique de la Russie : la philosophie religieuse russe du siècle d'argent, le cosmisme russe et le marxisme russe. On montre comment, dans le cadre de la philosophie russe, aussi bien avant qu'après 1917, des (...) tentatives originales ont tenté d'interpréter la rationalité de façon non classique et la manière don't elles ont influencé la logique contemporaine ainsi que d'autres sciences humaines : la psychologie, la linguistique, la théorie littéraire. L'article examine l'étouffement de la pensée philosophique à l'époque du stalinisme et la renaissance, dans la seconde moitié du siècle, de toute une série d'orientations philosophiques (la théorie de la connaissance, la logique, la philosophie et la méthodologie de la science, la philosophie de la psychologie, l'anthropologie philosophique, l'histoire de la philosophie). Des arguments sont présentés pour étayer la thèse d'un élargissement significatif de la problématique et de l'apparition de nombreuses directions philosophiques qui se développent de façon concomitante dans la philosophie russe contemporaine (postérieure à 1991). En conclusion, les auteurs évoquent l'organisation institutionnelle de la vie philosophique dans le pays. (shrink)

The interpretation of the theoretical content of the ethics of Democritus, as well as of its place in the history of ethical thought, encounters a special difficulty. Democritus' ethics, which has come down to us in fragments, the authenticity of which is still a matter of debate, is full of evident contradictions. It contains mutually exclusive judgments on questions which were the principal subject matter of the intellectual polemics in ethics in the fifth century B.C. On the one hand, Democritus (...) put forth a rather definite naturalistic-individualistic thesis: "Pleasure and displeasure form the boundary between what is useful and what is harmful." On the other hand, he intellectualizes moral motives and states his belief in the existence of general ethical determinations: "There is one and the same good and one and the same truth for all people, whereas one thing is agreeable to one person, another thing to another." Democritus is just as contradictory on the question of the moral value of the state. We find in him an unambiguous affirmation equating a moral individual with the citizen of a city state: "The interests of the state should be above everything else, and we must see to it that it is well governed. To assist in this, we must not struggle against justice and use force for our own benefit against the general good. For a well-governed state is a mighty bastion: it encompasses all, and as long as it persists, everything is as one, but if it should perish, all perishes with it." Yet at the same time a moral model of actions for him involves emancipation from laws: "He called laws a bad invention and said: "The wise man should not obey the laws, he live freely.". (shrink)

This concise history of the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences includes discussion of the main periods of its development, its research problematic, and changes that have occurred in the life and work of the institute over the past two decades.

In his time, D. Hume made an observation that essentially predetermined the nature of subsequent ethics research. "In every system of morality that I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked," he wrote in A Treatise of Human Nature, "that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find that instead of the usual copulations (...) of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. … A reason should be given for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason."1 The obvious meaning of this statement is that the imperative nature of moral language cannot be considered an adequate expression of the essence of morality; rather, it conceals the erroneousness of its epistemologized schemes of explanation. The accuracy of such an interpretation of the excerpt, even if it were questionable on the basis of its literal meaning, raises no doubt in the general context of Hume's own ethics where morality is identified with a special moral sense-a sense of sympathy that can be revealed effectively without the compelling force of duty. By some strange logic, ethics after Hume turned his warning into a positive program and saw its task as laying bare the concept of the moral "ought" and trying to find a transition from "is" to "ought." These persistent and multifaceted efforts, which enriched the theory of ethics in many ways, nevertheless did not achieve their immediate goal. The question arises, then, whether the negative result was not predetermined by an improper formulation of the problem itself that arose from the assumption that the specific nature of morality is connected with its imperativeness. (shrink)

The article stresses the consistency and agreement between Kant's categorical claim about impermissibility of lying and his moral philosophy. Rejecting the case-study approach to Kant's essay, the author treats it as a most appropriate illustration of the ethics of duty, seeing in the forbiddance of lying a necessary consequence of Kant's absolutist ethical. As a solution to some practical situations allegedly allowing ethical dishonesty, the author proposes to consider the norm "Do not lie" as a categorical requirement in the realm (...) of speech, thus giving the individual an ability to maintain his moral integrity and at the same time remain within the bounds of practical prudence. (shrink)

Journalism; journalistic ethics; Turkey.